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Abstract 
 
This paper considers the model of school effectiveness (SE) currently dominant in 
research, policy and practice in England (although the concerns it raises are 
international). It shows, principally through consideration of initial and propagated 
error, that SE results cannot be relied upon. By considering the residual difference 
between the predicted and obtained score for all pupils in any phase of education, SE 
calculations leave the results to be disproportionately made up of relative error terms. 
Adding contextual information confuses but does not help this situation. Having 
shown and illustrated the sensitivity of SE to this propagation of initial errors, and 
therefore why it is unworkable, the paper considers some of the reasons why SE has 
become dominant, outlines the damage this dominant model causes, and begins to 
shape alternative ways of considering what schools do.  
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This paper considers the model of school effectiveness (SE) currently dominant in 
research, policy and practice in England (although the concerns it raises are 
international). It shows, principally through consideration of initial and propagated 
error, that SE results cannot be relied upon. By considering the residual difference 
between the predicted and obtained score for all pupils in any phase of education, SE 
calculations leave the results to be disproportionately made up of relative error terms. 
Adding contextual information confuses but does not help this situation. Having 
shown and illustrated the sensitivity of SE to this propagation of initial errors, and 
therefore why it is unworkable, the paper considers some of the reasons why SE has 
become dominant, outlines the damage this dominant model causes, and begins to 
shape alternative ways of considering what schools do.  
 
 
The dominance of the school effectiveness model 
 
There a number of valid possible reasons for wanting to be able to judge school 
performance. In most developed countries, the majority of schools are publicly 
funded, and so the custodians of public money want to assess how well that money is 
being used, for example. Policy-makers will be interested in how well this public 
service is working, and what the impact has been of any recent reforms. Parents and 
students might want to use a measure of school quality when making educational 
choices. Heads and teachers might want feedback on what is working well and what is 
in need of improvement at their own schools. There are also, of course, a number of 
differing ways of judging school performance. Schools could be evaluated in terms of 
financial efficiency, student attendance, student enjoyment of education, future 
student participation in education, student aspiration, preparation for citizenship and 
so on. Another perfectly proper indicator of school success can be based on student 
scores in assessments intended to discover how much or how well students have 
learnt what is taught in the school. What is interesting is how dominant this last 
version of school effectiveness has become over the last 50 years in the UK and 
elsewhere. This paper looks at the dominant approach to evaluating school 
performance, presenting fatal flaws in its logic, and so arguing that it is time to stop 
using this now traditional but limited view of what schools are for.  
 
For any set of schools, if we rank them by their student scores in assessments of 
learning (the actual comparability and validity of such assessments is discussed in a 
later section), then we would tend to find that schools at the high and low ends 
differed in more than their student assessments. Schools in areas with more expensive 
housing (or more local income in the US), schools that select their student intake by 
ability, aptitude or even religion, and schools requiring parents to pay for their child’s 
attendance, will be more prevalent among the high scores. Schools with high student 
mobility, in inner-cities, taking high proportions of children living in poverty or with 
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a different home language to the language of instruction, may be more prevalent 
among the low scores. This is well known, and means that raw-score indicators are 
not a fair test of school performance. Some early studies of school effectiveness 
famously found very little or no difference at all in the outcomes of schools once 
these kinds of student intake differences had been taken into account (Coleman et al. 
1966). Such studies, using either or both of student prior attainment and student 
family background variables, have continued since then (Coleman et al. 1982, Gorard 
2000a), and continue today (Lubienski and Lubienski 2006). The differences in 
student outcomes between individual schools, and types and sectors of schools, can be 
largely explained by the differences in their student intakes. The larger the sample, the 
better the study, and the more reliable the measures involved, the higher percentage of 
raw-score difference between schools that can be explained (Shipman 1997, Tymms 
2003). Looked at in this way, it seems that which school a student attends makes little 
difference to their learning (as assessed by these means).  
 
However, over the past 30 years a different series of studies have come to an almost 
opposite conclusion, based on pretty much the same evidence. Starting with Rutter et 
al. (1979) in the UK, and perhaps a little earlier in the US, school effectiveness 
researchers have accepted that much or most of the variation in school outcomes is 
due to school intake characteristics. But they have claimed that the residual variation 
(any difference in raw-scores unexplained by student intake) is, or can be, evidence of 
differential school effectiveness (e.g. Nuttall et al. 1989, Gray and Wilcox 1995, 
Kyriakides 2008). Like the first set of studies, these have tended to become more 
sophisticated and more technical over time. But the fundamental difference in view 
remains. Is the variation in school outcomes unexplained by student background just 
the messy stuff left over by the process of analysis? Or is it large enough, robust and 
invariant enough over time, to be accounted a school ‘effect’? Can we promote, 
reward, and reprimand schools and teachers on this basis. Almost by default the 
answer to the second question has been assumed by most research users to be ‘yes’ 
(Barber and Moursched 2007, Sanders 2000). There has been generally weak 
opposition to the dominant technical model of school effectiveness, perhaps stemming 
from inability to understand the technicalities (such as in Slee et al. 1998).1  
 
Governments, such as that in the UK at time of writing, generally assume that there is 
a school effect. In England, DCSF (2007) rightly report that in comparing the 
performance of schools we must recognise that pupils have different starting points 
when arriving at any school, that schools have different proportions of pupils at any 
starting point, and that other external factors will affect the progress made by pupils.2 
They conclude from this that their Contextual Value Added analysis (CVA) ‘gives a 
much fairer statistical measure of the effectiveness of a school, and provides a solid 
basis for comparisons’ (p.2, emphasis added). On this basis, school inspection grades 
are partly pre-determined, schools are lauded or criticised, and league tables are 
created to assisted parental choice (see later section). How does this CVA work? 
 
                                                 
1 I exclude some chapters from this statement of inability to comprehend, most especially the chapter 
by Brown (1998), which I urge everyone to read.  
 
2 The Department for Children, Schools and Families is responsible for the organisation of schools and 
childrens’ services in England.  
 
 3
CVA is based on a value-added (VA) score for each pupil, calculated as the difference 
between their own outcome point score and the median outcome score for all pupils 
with the same prior (input) score. For example, in Key Stage 2 to Key Stage 4 CVA, 
the average points score at KS2 is calculated for all KS4 pupils in all maintained 
schools (and non-maintained special schools) in England.3 The average is of the 
scores (‘fine grades’) for each pupil in three core subjects (English, maths, and 
science). Then the ‘best 8’ (capped GCSE equivalent) KS4 score is calculated for 
each pupil. These figures yield the median KS4 score for each KS2 score. The 
difference between the median and the actual KS4 score for each pupil is their 
individual VA score. This difference is adjusted for the individual pupil 
characteristics, including sex, special needs, ethnicity, eligibility for free school meals 
(FSM), first language, mobility, precise age, whether in care, and an areal measure of 
the proportion of households on low income (IDACI – an index of deprivation). The 
result is further adjusted for the school-level mean prior attainment of each pupil’s 
school, where the results are at the extremes (threshold effects), and by a ‘shrinkage 
factor’ determined by the number of pupils in each school cohort.4 
 
More formally and precisely, the KS4 prediction for any pupil in 2007 is given as:5 
 
162.1  
+0.3807 * (the squared school average KS2 score) 
-5.944 * school average KS2 score  
+1.396 * (KS2 English points - school average KS2 score)  
-0.109 * (KS2 maths points - school average KS2 score)  
-27.1 (if in care)  
-59.51 * IDACI score  
-34.37 (if School Action SEN)  
-65.76 (if Action Plus or statement of SEN)  
-73.55 (if joined after September of year 10)  
-23.43 (if joined not in July/August/September of years 7-9)  
+14.52 (if female)  
-12.94 * (age within year, where 31st August is 0 and 1st September is 1)  
+ for English as an additional language pupils only (-8.328 -0.1428*(school 
average KS2 score)2 + 4.93 * school average KS2 score)  
+ ethnicity coefficient, from a pre-defined table 
                                                 
3 Key Stage 2 leads to statutory testing at the end of primary education, usually for pupils aged 11. Key 
Stage 4 leads to assessment at age 16, currently the legal age at which a pupil can leave school.  
 
4 These variables are used by DCSF for a number of reasons, including the fact that they are available 
at an individual level with reasonably complete data. Of course, other variables might be useful both at 
individual level, such as parents’ occupation, and at school level, such as qualifications of teachers. 
Indeed, analyses for other purposes quite properly use different combinations of variables. However, 
the critique of CVA and school effectiveness presented here does not depend on the precise variables 
used. Occupation is harder to classify, and generally less complete as a field than eligibility for free 
school meals, for example. The omission of potentially important measures of individuals and schools 
can lead to another form of bias in the results, by making the variables that are included appear more 
important.  
 
5 Whereas both the ethnicity coefficient and the FSM/ethnicity interaction are 0 for White pupils, they 
are 29.190 and 20.4600 respectively for Black African pupils, for example. 
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+ for FSM pupils only (-22.9 + FSM/ethnicity interaction, from a pre-defined 
table)  
+ 1.962 * cohort average KS2 score  
- 4.815 * standard deviation of cohort average KS2 score  
 
Equivalent models apply to CVA calculations for other stages of schooling, such as 
KS1 to KS2. Is the claim that a complex calculation such as this provides a solid basis 
for comparing school performance actually true? 
 
 
Errors in the data 
 
This kind of calculation looks very neat, if somewhat complex, and the logic seems 
plausible. SE models like CVA take the prior attainment and context of the student 
into account in order to judge their progress during one phase of schooling. This 
should be a better measure of the relative success than the raw-score results. Of 
course, the process depends heavily on the quality of the data used in the calculation. 
If the data is complete, correct, and an excellent measure of what it is intended to 
measure, then the process of calculating school effects in this way looks and sounds 
as though it has merit. Unfortunately, the kinds of datasets used for the job are 
necessarily incomplete, and contain both inaccuracies and errors in measurement. 
This section continues the example of CVA (above) as an illustration of the range and 
importance of these errors. The following section then shows how these errors 
propagate through the process of computation, making the results of school 
effectiveness calculations rather meaningless. 
 
The first consideration is the completeness of the kinds of data needed for school 
effectiveness calculations. CVA in England is calculated using two linked official 
datasets – the National Pupil Database (NPD) and the Pupil Level Annual School 
Census (PLASC).6 All schools are required by law to provide figures for these in the 
January of each school year, further data is added from existing official sources, and 
funding for the school hinges on their completion. PLASC contains a record for every 
pupil in maintained schools in England, detailing their background characteristics, 
including periods in-care, special needs status and first language. It also has some 
attainment data. NPD holds individual records on every pupil in maintained schools in 
England, detailing their examination and assessment entry and attainment, and also 
has some background data. They provide a wonderful and welcome resource for the 
researcher, at least the equal of equivalent datasets in other developed countries. 
Nevertheless, the records are not complete. 
 
There are missing cases in the data, some by design such as those 7% of pupils 
attending private schools, and those educated at home. In addition, there will be small 
number of cases in transition between schools, or may otherwise not be in, or 
registered for, a school. Further, although both databases ostensibly contain records 
for all other pupils, in some years around 10% of the individual pupil records are un-
matched across the two databases (see analysis by Gorard and See 2009, for 
example). This means, of course, that their background and attainment data cannot be 
                                                 
6 For further explanation, contact the PLASC/NPD User Group (PLUG) at 
http://www.bris.ac.uk/Depts/CMPO/PLUG/. 
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matched. The same thing happens trying to match cases across phases of schooling for 
the same pupils. In 2007 for example, the dataset for the Key Stage 4 (KS4 or 15-
year-old) cohort contained records for 673,563 pupils, but nearly 10% of these could 
not be matched with the records of the same pupils from an earlier Key Stage such as 
KS2 (when they were 10-year-olds in the their final year of primary school). Any 
pupil moving to or from one of the other home countries of the UK such as Wales, 
where some statutory testing has been abolished, will have missing scores for one or 
more Key Stages. Any pupil moving from a private school, from a non-formal 
educational setting, or from outside the UK will similarly have no matching record of 
prior attainment at school on the PLASC/NPD system. In summary, perhaps nearly 
10% of children will be missing from the databases completely, up to 10% will have a 
missing prior attainment record, and up to 10% will not a matched record in either 
PLASC or NPD. There will be some overlap between these missing cases, but this 
already represents a far from complete dataset.  
 
The second consideration is the data missing even from those cases that do have 
records in the databases. In the 2007 PLASC/NPD datasets used to calculate CVA, 
every KS4 variable, including both the contextual and attainment variables, had a high 
proportion of missing cases. For example, whether a pupil was in-care had at least 
80,278 values missing (12% of all cases). At least 75,944 were missing a code for free 
school meal eligibility (an important indicator of family poverty for CVA purposes). 
This represents over 11% of cases. Even when data does not appear as missing, it is 
effectively missing, such as the codes ‘Refused’ and ‘Not obtained’ which are 
additional to all data on pupil ethnic background which are coded as missing. There is 
again some overlap between these missing cases, but only some. For example, if we 
delete from the 2007 PLASC/NPD all cases missing data on FSM, in-care, special 
needs, sex and/or ethnicity data then the database drops in size to 577,115 pupils (or 
85% of its apparent size, which was already itself incomplete as explained above).7 If 
we consider all of the variables used in CVA, including further contextual variables 
such as pupil first language, and the attainment scores for each subject and grade 
(there are many of these), it is probable that less than 50% of the children of England 
in any age cohort have a record in all relevant databases that is complete in terms of 
all key variables.  
 
One of the reasons for using area-based measures such as the index of deprivation 
(IDACI) is that they can replace missing data for individuals to some extent. 
However, this geographical approach suffers from two clear defects. First, it 
introduces a kind of ecological fallacy by assuming that everyone has the modal 
characteristics of the other people in the area where they live. Second, it relies on 
knowing the post code (area or ZIP code) of all individuals anyway. In the 2007 
PLASCC/NPD, at least 69,902 (well over 10%) of the IDACI scores are missing 
because the address of the pupil is unknown. This then also introduces a clear error in 
at least one variable for all pupil records. The IDACI scores for all pupils, and as used 
in the CVA model, are calculated on the basis of scores for all households in England. 
Since the dataset used for this purpose does not, in fact, contain data for all 
households this means that all IDACI scores have an error component due to missing 
data over and above any errors in measuring household income (Gorard 2008a). Then 
                                                 
7 Author’s analysis using 2007 datasets for the purposes of this paper.  
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we need to realise that all of this missing data occurs not only in the KS4 datasets 
when the pupil is 15 or 16 but also in any other matched dataset such as KS2 used for 
the prior attainment scores when the pupil was aged 10 or 11. It is clear that missing 
data is a huge problem for any analysis of PLASC/NPD. 
 
In practice, missing cases are simply ignored, and missing values are replaced with a 
default substitute – usually the mean score or modal category (and male for sex of 
pupil). So, the DCSF analysts assume that pupils without IDACI scores (usually 
because they have no post code) live in average income neighbourhoods, and that 
where we do not know when a pupil joined their present school we should assume 
that they have been in attendance for a long time. Anyone whose eligibility for FSM 
is not known is assumed not to be living in poverty, anyone without a KS2 or KS4 
exam score is an average attainer, and so on. These kinds of assumptions have to be 
made in order not to lose the high number of cases with at least one missing value in a 
critical variable. But these are very questionable assumptions. There is plenty of 
evidence of differences between pupils with complete and incomplete values in such 
datasets (Amrein-Beardsley 2008). And making these unjustified assumptions then 
means that a very high proportion of cases are very likely to have an incorrect value in 
at least one critical variable.  
 
How good then is the data that is not missing? Assessment via examination, project, 
coursework or teacher’s grading is an imperfect process. There are huge and well-
documented issues of comparability in assessment scores between years of 
assessment, curriculum subjects, modes of assessment, examining boards, and types 
of qualifications (among other issues, see Nuttall 1979, Newton 1997, Gorard 2000b). 
In fact, public assessment is generally handled well in England, and the kinds of high 
profile errors reported by Ofqual and others, such as up to 45% of candidates awarded 
the wrong grade in an extreme case, (Stewart 2009), are understandable in the light of 
a complex national testing and regulatory system (see below). To some extent these 
problems are coming to light because key figures at QCA decided that the public 
should be a given a more realistic picture of what test and exam ‘standards’ mean 
(http://www.ofqual.gov.uk/files/2009-03-18-national-curriculum-test-reviews-2000-
7.pdf). Moderation will be imperfect and mistakes will be made. But we must assume 
a reasonable level of error in any assessment data of the kind used to calculate CVA.  
 
Even when the system correctly assigns grades to pupils in their assessments we 
cannot be sure that they are free from error for a number of reasons. If we take the 
underlying competence of the pupil as the true measure wanted in an assessment, even 
a perfect assessment instrument could lead to error in the achieved measure due to 
differences in the setting for the assessment (a fire alarm going off in one examination 
hall, for example), time of day, inadvertent (and sometimes deliberate) teacher 
assistance, the health of the candidate, and so on. Competence is not an easy thing to 
measure, unlike the length of the exam hall or the number of people in it. However 
well-constructed the assessment system, we must assume a reasonable level of 
measurement error in the results.  
 
Then the CVA analyst is faced with issues of aggregation and comparability. For 
example, the KS4 analysis involves GCSEs handled by different examining boards, 
sometimes taken via modules in different years, and for all different subjects and tiers 
of entry. Some GCSEs will be short courses, counting for half of credit of full GCSEs. 
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Even if an analyst is fairly sure about the comparability and reliability of such scores, 
these will have to be aggregated with results from an increasing number of different 
qualifications. In 2007, these included GNVQ Intermediate, NVQ, National 
Certificate in Business, BTEC, Key Skills, Basic Skills, and Asset Language Units. 
These all have to be converted to the common ‘currency’ of point scores, despite the 
fact that their grading structures are completely different. No one should try to claim 
that this aggregation to ‘best 8’ points scores does not add further errors to those 
catalogued so far. Issues of comparability are widely known, acknowledged and 
international in nature (Lamprianou 2009). 
 
The same kind of consideration applies to any contextual variables. Even in 
NPD/PLASC with a simple binary code for sex, a few pupils are coded as male in one 
and female in the other database (more have nothing coded, and one or two have an 
invalid code, presumably from a data entry error). The error component in variables 
such as FSM, ethnicity, first language, and perhaps most particularly SEN, is even 
greater. Special educational needs, for example, are represented by a variable having 
three possible sources (School Action, Action Plus, or a statement). Some of these are 
the responsibility of the school, and some are sensitive to the actions of parents 
motivated to gain extra time in examinations for their children. The number of pupils 
with recorded SEN shows huge variation over years in the same schools, and appear 
in very different proportions in different parts of England (Gorard et al. 2003). Ethnic 
groups (based on 19 categories for CVA) are notoriously difficult to classify (Gorard 
2008a). Here they are used in interaction with FSM eligibility (itself an incomplete 
measure). First language is almost as complex to classify as ethnic group. Is it home 
language, language of origin, or language of choice? Here it is used in interaction with 
prior attainment scores, since having a language other than English is calculated by 
the CVA model to be a disadvantage for low prior attainers, but not for high attainers. 
Where variables are used in interaction like this, to calculate CVA, an error in either 
one of them leads to an error in the combined result.  
 
Once all of the relevant measurements have been achieved, they must be coded, 
entered into the databases and stored in binary floating-point format. Each step in this 
process allows the introduction of further errors. Coding data is subject to a low level 
of error even when conducted diligently, and not all such errors will be spotted by 
quality control systems dealing with hundreds of variables relating to millions of 
pupils every year. Then the data must be entered (transcribed) and low level errors are 
liable to creep in again. Data can be corrupted in storage (magnetic dropout 
undetected by parity checks and similar) and in sorting and matching of cases (most 
often caused by incorrect selection of rows or columns). Even a value for a pupil that 
is present and entered and stored ‘correctly’ is liable to be in error, due to the change 
in number base and the finite number of binary digits used to store it. The simple 
decimal fraction 0.1, for example, cannot be exactly represented in the binary 
numbering system used by computers and calculators. Thus, representing 0.1 in one 
byte (8 bits) would lead to an error of over 6% even in an otherwise perfect 
measurement. All numbers are generally stored in floating point form, involving a 
fractional mantissa and a binary exponent. Thus, the problem of representational 
errors can happen with any figure, whether it is an integer in denary or not. However 
many bits are allocated by a computer to storage of a number there will be, by 
definition, an infinite number of denary values that cannot be stored precisely. 
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Increased accuracy decreases these representational errors, but can not eliminate 
them. 
 
At the end of all this it is hard to believe that any pupil record will be free from all 
errors, with so many areas for errors to creep into the data from missing cases to 
conversion to binary. However, the CVA formula used by DCSF uses the 
measurements in calculations supposed to be accurate to at least four decimal places. 
It multiplies individual point scores coefficients represented to decimal places (i.e. 
claiming to be correct to 5/1000ths of a point) and multiplies them by coefficients 
with four decimal places (such as +0.3807). So in the example on the CVA website, 
the first term after the constant in the CVA formula could be 29.56 squared times 
0.3807. This would be 332.6532235 (correct to 5 parts in 10 million). This is pseudo-
quantification of the worst kind. There is no way that the initial figures are accurate 
enough to sustain this kind of calculation, as the next section illustrates. CVA in 
England has been used as an illustration of the problems in the data even for an 
excellent dataset. Similar problems or worse appear in other official datasets in the 
UK (Gorard 2008a) and in other countries like the USA (Sanders and Horn 1998, 
p.248).  
 
It is worth pointing out at this stage in the argument that any analysis using real data 
with some combination of the inevitable measurement errors described so far will lead 
to an incorrect result. Of course, the more accurate the measures are the closer to the 
ideal correct answer we can be. However, we have no reason to believe that any or all 
of these sources of error lead to random measurement error (of the kind that might 
come from random sampling variation, for example). Those refusing to take part in a 
survey, those not registered at school, those unwilling to reveal their family income or 
benefit (for free school meal eligibility purposes) cannot be imagined as some kind of 
random sub-set of the school population. Like every stage in the error generation 
process described so far, they are not random in nature, occurrence or source. What 
happens to these errors in a school effectiveness calculation? 
 
 
The propagation of errors 
 
For any real measurement that we use for analysis we must assume the possibility of 
measurement error. Measurement error in this context means a difference between the 
ideal or perfectly isomorphic representation of something and our achieved measure. 
If someone actually has three children but our measurement claims that they have two 
children, then our measurement of the number of children is in error by one. This 
simple discrepancy is often termed the absolute error. A more useful way of 
envisaging such an error is as a fraction of the measurement itself – the relative error. 
In this example, the relative error is 1/2. In trying to measure 3 we achieve a measure 
of 2 which is out by 1. If we were out by 1 in attempting to measure the number of 
children in the entire country, this would not be such a serious measurement error, and 
the relative error would be much smaller than 1/2.8  
 
                                                 
8 Strictly, the relative error is 1/3 based on the true value we are trying to measure. In practice of course 
we do not know this value else there would be no error, so all relative errors are here based on the 
achieved measure instead.  
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As a consequence of the errors discussed in the previous section, imagine for the sake 
of argument that all measures such as pupil prior attainment used in CVA were only 
90% accurate, having a relative error of 1/10. What would this mean? In itself, it tells 
us what we already know – that the score for any pupil cannot be guaranteed to be 
accurate. We should not treat a score for one pupil of 70 as being substantially 
difference in practice from a score of 73 for another pupil. The difference between 
them is smaller than the error bound of each. On the other hand, it means that a score 
of 70 can be treated as substantially different from a score of 100, since the difference 
is greater than the error bound. Put another way an achieved score of 70 in the 
database could be between 63 and 77 in reality (+/-10%). An achieved score of 100 
could be between 90 and 110 in reality. Since 90 is still larger than 77 we can proceed 
with some confidence that the score represented by 100 really is larger than the score 
of 70. For normal descriptive purposes in education and social science a relative error 
of 10% in our achieved figures is acceptable. But what happens when we feed scores 
such as these into a school effectiveness calculation like CVA? 
 
Errors are said to ‘propagate’ through calculations, meaning that everything we do 
with our achieved measures we also do with their measurement errors. The relative 
error changes as a consequence. If we have two numbers X and Y measured 
imperfectly as x and y with corresponding absolute errors εx and εy then: 
 
x = X ± εx 
 
and  
 
y = Y ± εy 
 
When we attempt to calculate X-Y, we actually get x-y which is equal to (X ± εx) - (Y 
± εy). The upper bound for this is X-Y + εx+εy. Put another way, since we do not know 
whether the errors in either number are positive or negative when we subtract we may 
be adding the error components (and vice versa of course).  
 
In England, the model for contextualised value-added analysis used by the 
Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) involves finding for all pupils 
‘the difference (positive or negative) between their predicted and actual attainment’ 
(DCSF 2007, p.7). The predicted attainment for any one pupil is based on the average 
gain score for all pupils with the same prior attainment (adjusted for contextual 
information). The difference between any pupil’s predicted and actual attainment will 
tend to be insubstantial for two reasons. First, the predicted and actual attainment 
scores are not just of same magnitude, and using the same points system. They are 
designed to be as close as possible to each other. Second, if the predicted and actual 
attainment scores were not very close for a majority of pupils then the model would 
not be any good. This means that the figure computed for the pupil value-added score 
is usually very small, perhaps even negligible, in comparison to the attainment scores 
from which it is calculated. CVA subtracts the predicted and actual attainment to 
create a much smaller figure, but adds their maximum errors (since we do not know if 
the errors are positive or negative).  
 
For an illustration of the importance of this propagation of errors, imagine a pupil 
with an actual points score of 100 for attainment at KS4, but with a predicted points 
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score of 99. The prediction is a good one in that it is close, but the pupil appears to 
have made marginally more progress than expected. Both scores are assumed to be 
90% accurate (see above). This relative error of only 10% is a very conservative 
estimate given the multiple sources of error described in the previous section, and the 
scale of missing data. The predicted score, based on all of the CVA variables in 
isolation and in interaction will have a much larger error component than this in 
reality. But even an error of 10% means that the actual score for this pupil could be 
anywhere between 90 and 110 in reality, and the predicted score ought to be 
anywhere from 89.1 to 108.9. This means that the real residual score for this pupil 
(their CVA score) could be anything from +20.9 (110-89.1) to -18.9 (90-108.9). The 
maximum relative error in the calculated answer of +1 is a massive 3,980%. By 
subtracting two similar numbers with an acceptable level of initial error (10%) we are 
left with an ‘answer’ composed almost entirely of error (3,980%). We genuinely have 
no idea whether this pupil has done better or worse than expected. There is no way 
that such a result could be used for any practical purpose. If the initial relative error in 
either the actual or the predicted score is greater than 10%, as it almost certainly 
would be in reality, the error in the CVA result would be even greater than this 40 
times the size of the result itself.  
 
Where the actual and predicted score are the same for any pupil (i.e. when the CVA 
model works well), the residual score is zero and so the relative error in the result is 
infinite. As the achieved and predicted scores diverge the relative error in the residual 
tends to decline. But this then means that the CVA model, which is meant to make 
accurate predictions, is not working well. If the predictions are so far out that we can 
begin to ignore the error components is this better or worse for the school 
effectiveness model? In order to retain something like the relative error of 10% in the 
original scores, the CVA prediction would have to be out by a long way from the 
achieved result. For example, a predicted score of 50 with a 10% initial error 
represents a range of 45 to 55. An actual score for the same pupil of 100 with a 10% 
initial error represents a range of 90 to 110. This means that the real residual score for 
this pupil (their CVA score) could be anything from +65 (110-45) to +35 (90-55). 
This yields a maximum relative error of 60% in the resulting CVA score of +50. So 
even when the CVA prediction is way out, as in this example, an initial error of 10% 
propagates to 60% via simple subtraction. If we assume that the school effectiveness 
model is capturing anything sensible at all, this pupil can be deemed to have done 
very well (or to have done very badly in the prior assessment, or both). This is true 
even if the maximum error applies. How can we tell whether any CVA score (for 
pupil, teacher, department, school or area) is of this kind, where we cannot be sure 
about the precise figure but we can be sure that the result is so far away from that 
predicted as to dwarf any error component?  
 
 
The allure of technical solutions 
 
Unfortunately the field of school effectiveness research works on the invalid 
assumption that errors in the data are random in nature and so can be estimated, and 
weighted for, by techniques based on random sampling theory. These techniques are 
fatally flawed, in their own terms, even when used ‘correctly’ with random samples 
(Gorard 2010). The conditional probabilities generated by sampling theory tell us, 
under strict conditions and assumptions, how often random samples would generate a 
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result as extreme or more extreme as the one we might be considering. The p-value in 
a significance test tells analysts the probability of observing a score as or more 
extreme as the measure they achieved, assuming that the score is actually no different 
from zero (and so that the divergence from zero is the result of random sampling 
variation alone). Of course, this conditional probability of the data given the nil null 
hypothesis is not what the analysts want. In a school effectiveness context such as the 
ones outlined above, the analyst wants to know whether the CVA score (the residual, 
whether for individual or school) is large enough to take note of (to dwarf its relative 
error). They actually want the probability of the null hypothesis given the data they 
observed. They could convert the former to the latter using Bayes’ Theorem, as long 
as they already knew the underlying and unconditional probability of the null 
hypothesis anyway. But they cannot know the latter. So they imagine that the 
probability of the data given the null hypothesis is the same as, or closely related to, 
the probability of the null hypothesis given the data. They then use the p-value from 
significance tests to ‘reject’ the null hypothesis on which the p-value is predicated. 
This modus tollens kind of argument does not work with likelihoods, for a number of 
reasons, including Jeffrey’s so-called paradox that a low probability for the data can 
be associated with a high probability for the null hypothesis, or a low one, or a mid-
range value, and vice versa. It depends on the underlying probability of the null 
hypothesis - which we do not know.  
 
So, even used as intended, p-values can not help most analysts in the SE field. The 
same applies to standard errors, and confidence intervals and their variants. But the 
situation is worse than this because in the field of school effectiveness, these 
statistical techniques based on sampling theory are hardly ever used as intended. Most 
commonly, the sampling techniques are used with population figures such as 
NPD/PLASC. In this context, the techniques mean nothing.9 There is no sampling 
variation to estimate when working with population data (whether for a nation, region, 
education authority, school, year, class, or social group). There are missing cases and 
values, and there is measurement error. But these are not generated by random 
sampling, and so sampling theory cannot estimate them, adjust for them, or help us 
decide how substantial they are in relation to our manifest data.10  
                                                 
9 This does not prevent the widespread abuse of random sampling techniques with population data. A 
couple of recent examples will have to suffice. Hammond and Yeshanew (2007, p.102) base their 
analysis on a national dataset, but say ‘Although no actual samples have been drawn… Statistical 
checks were carried out and no significant difference between the groups was found’. They then 
present a table of standard errors for this population data (p.102). They have learnt to use multi-level 
modelling but clearly forgotten what significance means and what a standard error is. Similarly, 
Thomas, Peng and Gray (2007) examined data from one school district in England (and so a 
population, in statistical terms). Yet they report (p.271) that ‘the pupil intake and time trend 
explanatory variables included in the fixed part of the value-added model (Model A) were statistically 
significant (at 0.05 level)’.  
 
10 This misuse of sampling theory with population data has sometimes been defended by saying that the 
population figures are somehow a random sample of a theoretical ‘super-population’. In the example of 
PLASC/NPD, then, the school pupils are imagined as a random sample of all the children that could 
have been born to their parents, and the analyst seeks to generalise the findings to those unborn and 
never born children. But why should the born children be a random subset of the unborn? What does 
that even mean in real-life? Do politicians and parents know that this is what such statisticians mean? 
And why would anyone want to generalise to a non-existent and never-to-be-born group anyway? This 
is an example of the lengths than some analysts will go to in defending their sampling theory ’toys’. 
The approach has long been discredited (Camilli 1996, Gorard 2008b).   
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Despite all this, DCSF use and attempt to defend the use of confidence intervals with 
their population CVA data. A confidence interval, remember, is an estimate of the 
range of values that would be generated by repeated random sampling, assuming fro 
calculations purposes that our manifest score is the correct one. It has no relevance at 
all to population data like PLASC/NPD. It is of no real use to an analyst, even when 
calculated with for a random sample, for the same reasons as for p-values.11 The 
analyst wants a probable range for the true value of the estimate, but to get this they 
would have to have access to underlying data that is never available to them. And as 
with p-values, it does not even make sense to calculate a confidence interval for 
population data of any kind. Confidence intervals are therefore of no use in standard 
school effectiveness research.12 
 
However, the field as a whole simply ignores these quite elementary logical problems, 
while devising more and more complex models comprehended by fewer and fewer 
people. Perhaps the most common inappropriate complex technique used in this field 
is multi-level (hierarchical linear) modelling. This technique was devised as one of 
many equivalent ways of overcoming the correlation between cases in cluster-
randomised samples (Gorard 2009a). This, like all other techniques based on 
sampling theory, is of no consequence for school effectiveness work based on 
population figures. Advocates now claim that such models have other purposes – such 
as allowing analysts to partition variation in scores between levels such as individuals, 
schools and districts. But such partitioning can, like overcoming the inter-correlation 
in clusters, be done in other and generally simpler ways. Anyway, the technique is 
still pointless. Most such models do not use districts or areas as a level, and those that 
do tend to find little or no variation there once other levels have been accounted for 
(Smith and Street 2006, Tymms et al. 2008). We know that pupil-level variables, 
including prior attainment and contextual values, are key in driving school outcomes. 
The question remains, therefore, whether there is a school effect. If our pupil-level 
predictions of subsequent attainment are less than perfect, we could attribute much of 
the residual unexplained variation to the initial and propagated measurement error in 
our data. To use multi-level modelling to allocate most of this residual variation to a 
‘school effect’ instead is to assume from the outset that which the modelling is 
supposed to be seeking or testing. 
 
 
So why does school effectiveness seem to work? 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
11 Some commentators and even some purported training resources suggest that a confidence interval is 
a band within which we can be reasonably confident the true population figure appears. This is a 
simple error of understanding. All confidence intervals have the manifest score at their centre, and are 
clearly a band of likely scores we would achieve if the random sampling that led to the manifest score 
were repeated, and using the manifest score is our best (only) guess so far. We have no idea where the 
true population figure actually is, other than from that guess, unless we have the population figures (as 
we do in this paper). If we have the population figures (as we do in this paper) we do not need 
confidence intervals, and they make no sense then anyway. 
 
12 Some purported authorities on school effectiveness still erroneously propose the use of confidence 
intervals with school effectiveness scores based on population figures (e.g. Goldstein 2008).  
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Why, if the foregoing is true, do so many analysts, policy-makers, users and 
practitioners seem to believe that school effectiveness yields useful and practical 
information? It is tempting to say that perhaps many of them have not really thought 
about the process and have simply bought into what appears to be a scientific and 
technical solution to judging school performance. I use the term ‘bought’ advisedly 
here because part of the answer might also lie in the money to be made. In England, 
school effectiveness has become an industry, employing civil servants at DCSF and 
elsewhere, producing incentives for teachers deemed CVA experts in schools, 
creating companies and consultants to provide data analysis, paying royalties to 
software authors, and funding for academics from the taxpayer. A cynical view would 
be that most people in England do not understand CVA, and a high proportion of 
those that do stand to gain from its use in some way.  
 
There is sometimes no consistent adherence to school effectiveness as a model, even 
among individual policy-makers and departments. Some of the schools required by 
DCSF in 2008 to take part in the National Challenge, because their (raw-score) results 
were so poor, were also sent a letter from DCSF congratulating them on their high 
value-added results and asking them to act as models or mentors for emergent 
Academies. The ‘paradox of the National Challenge Scheme’ continues (Maddern 
2008, p.23). Again, a cynic might say that users use raw scores when it suits them 
(traditional fee-paying schools seem uninterested in value-added while often having 
very high raw scores, for example), and they use value-added when that paints a better 
picture.  
 
However, it is possible that the problem stems chiefly from our lack of ability to 
calibrate the results of school effectiveness models against anything except 
themselves. In everyday measurements of time, length, temperature and so on we get 
a sense of the accuracy of our measuring scales by comparing measurements with the 
qualities being measured (Gorard 2009b). There is no equivalent for CVA (what 
Amrein-Beardsley refers to as criterion-related validity). The scores are just like 
magic figures emerging from a long-winded and quasi-rational calculation. Their 
advocates claim that these figures represent ‘solid’ and fair school performance 
measures, but they can provide nothing except the purported plausibility of the 
calculation to justify that. Supposing, for the sake of argument, that the calculation did 
not work for the reasons given in this paper so far. What would we expect to emerge 
from it? The fact that the data is riddled with initial errors and that these propagate 
through the calculation does not mean that we should expect the results for all schools 
to be the same, once contextualised prior attainment is accounted for. The bigger the 
deviations between predicted and attained results, of the kind that SE researchers 
claim as evidence of effectiveness, the more this could also be evidence of the error 
component. In this situation, the bigger the error in the results the bigger the effect 
might appear to be to some. So, we cannot improve our approach to get a bigger effect 
to outscore the error component. Whatever the residuals are we simply do not know if 
they are error or effect. We do know, however, that increasing the quality and scale of 
the data is associated with a decrease in the apparent school effect (Tymms 2003). 
 
If the VA residuals were actually only error, how would the results behave? We 
would expect CVA results to be volatile and inconsistent over years and between key 
stages in the same schools. This is what we generally find (Hoyle and Robinson 2003, 
Tymms and Dean 2004, Kelly and Monczunski 2007). Of course, in any group of 
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schools under consideration, some schools will have apparently consistent positive or 
negative CVA over a period of time. This, in itself, means nothing. Again imagine 
what we would expect if the ‘effect’ were actually all propagated error. Since CVA is 
zero-sum by design, around half of all schools in any one year would have positive 
scores and half negative. If the CVA were truly meaningless, then we might expect 
around one quarter of all schools to have successive positive CVA scores over two 
years (and one quarter negative). Again, this is what we find. Post hoc, we cannot use 
a run of similar scores to suggest consistency without consideration of what we would 
expect if the scores meant nothing. Thomas, Peng and Gray (2007) looked at 
successive years of positive VA in one England district from 1993-2002. They 
seemed perplexed that ‘it appears that only one in 16 schools managed to improve 
continuously for more than four years at some point over the decade in terms of 
value-added’ (p.261). Yet 1 in 16 schools with four successive positive scores is 
exactly how many would be predicted assuming that the scores mean nothing at all 
(since 2-4 equals 1/16).  
 
Leckie and Goldstein (2009) explain that VA scores for the same schools do not 
correlate highly over time. A number of studies have found VA correlations of around 
0.5 and 0.6 over two to five years for the same schools. Whatever it is that is 
producing VA measures for schools, it is ephemeral. A correlation of 0.5 after two 
years means that only 25% of the variation in VA is common to those years. Is this 
really any more than we would expect by chance? What is particularly interesting 
about this variability is that it does not appear in the raw scores. Raw scores for any 
school tend to be very similar from year to year, but the ‘underlying’ VA is not. Is this 
then evidence, as Leckie and Goldstein (2009) would have it, that VA really changes 
that much and so quickly, or does it just illustrate again the central point in this paper 
that VA is very sensitive to the propagation of relative error? 
 
The coefficients in the CVA model, fitted post hoc via multi-level regression, mean 
nothing in themselves. Even a table of complete random numbers can generate 
regression results as coherent (and convincing to some) as SE models (Gorard 2008b). 
With enough variables, combinations of variables and categories within variables 
(remember the 19 ethnic groups in interaction with FSM in CVA, for example) it is 
possible to create a perfect multiple correlation (R2=1.00) from completely 
nonsensical data. In this context, it is intriguing to note the observation by Glass 
(2004) that one school directly on a county line was attributed to both counties in the 
Tennessee Value Added Assessment System and two VA measures were calculated. 
The two results were completely different – suggesting perhaps that they did not 
really mean anything at all. Even advocates and pioneers of school effectiveness 
admit that the data and models we have do not allow us to differentiate, in reality, 
between school performances. ‘Importantly, when we account for prediction 
uncertainty, the comparison of schools becomes so imprecise that, at best, only a 
handful of schools can be significantly separated from the national average, or 
separated from any other school’ (Leckie and Goldstein 2009, p.16).  
 
Of course, the key calculation underlying CVA is the creation of the residual between 
actual and predicted pupil scores. Since this is based on two raw scores (the prior and 
current attainment of each pupil), it should not be surprising to discover that VA 
results are highly correlated with each of these raw scores (Gorard 2006, 2008c). The 
scale of this correlation is now routinely disguised by the contextual figures used in 
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CVA, but it is still there. In fact, the correlation between prior and current attainment 
is the same size as the correlation between prior attainment and VA scores. Put more 
simply, VA calculations are flawed from the outset by not being independent enough 
of the raw scores from which they are generated. They are no more a fair test of 
school performance than raw scores are. 
 
 
Damage caused by school effectiveness 
 
Does any of this matter? I would argue that it does. Schools, heads and teachers are 
being routinely rewarded or punished on the basis of this kind of evidence. Teachers 
are spending their time looking at things like departmental value-added figures and 
distorting their attention to focus on particular areas or types of pupils. School 
effectiveness results have been used to determine funding allocations and to threaten 
schools with closure (Bald 2006, Mansell 2006). The national school inspection 
system in England, run by OFSTED, starts with a CVA, and the results of that 
analysis partly pre-determine the results of the inspection (Gorard 2008c). Schools are 
paying public funds to external bodies for value-added analyses and breakdowns of 
their effectiveness data. Parents and pupils are being encouraged to use school 
effectiveness evidence (in league tables, for example) to judge their schools and 
potential schools. If, as I would argue, the results are largely spurious this means a lot 
of time and money is wasted and, more importantly, pupils’ education is being 
needlessly damaged.  
 
However, the dangers of school effectiveness are even greater than this. School 
effectiveness is associated with a narrow understanding of what education is for. It 
encourages, unwittingly, an emphasis on assessment and test scores – and teaching to 
the test – because over time we tend to get the system we measure for and so 
privilege. Further, rather than opening information about schools to a wider public, 
the complexity of CVA and similar models excludes and so disempowers most 
people. These are the people who pay tax for, work in, or send their children to 
schools. Even academics are largely excluded from understanding and so criticising 
school effectiveness work (Normand 2008). Relevant academic work is often peer-
reviewed and ‘quality’ checked by a relatively small clique. School effectiveness then 
tends to monopolise political expertise on schools and public discussion of education, 
even though most policy-makers, official bodies like OFSTED, and the public simply 
have to take the results on trust.  
 
The widespread use of CVA for league tables, official DCSF performance data, and in 
models of school effectiveness also has the inadvertent impact of making it harder to 
examine how well schools are doing with different groups of pupils. One of the main 
reasons for initially setting up a free (taxpayer-funded), universal and compulsory 
system of schools was to try and minimise the influence of pupil family background. 
The achievement gaps between rich and poor, or between ethnic and language groups, 
give schools and society some idea of how well that equitable objective is being met. 
What CVA does is to recognise that these gaps exist but then makes them invisible by 
factoring them into the VA prediction. It no longer makes sense to ask whether the 
CVA is any different in a school or a school system for rich and poor, or different 
ethnic and language groups. DCSF (2007) appear to recognise this danger when they 
say (in bold, p.2) ‘CVA should not be used to set lower expectations for any pupil or 
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group of pupils’. This means – bizarrely - that a school with a high level of poverty 
will be correctly predicted to have equivalently lower outcomes, but at the same time 
must not ‘expect’ lower outcomes.  
 
Finally, for the present section, it is important to recall that VA, CVA and the rest are 
all zero-sum calculations. The CVA for a pupil, teacher, department, school, or 
district is calculated relative to all others. Thus, around half of all non-zero scores will 
be positive and half negative. Whether intentionally or not, this creates a system 
clearly based on competition. A school could improve its results and still have 
negative CVA if everyone else improved as well. A school could even improve its 
results and get a worse CVA than before. The whole system could improve and half 
of the schools would still get negative CVA. Or all schools could get worse and half 
would still get positive CVA scores. And so on. It is not enough to do well. Others 
have to fail for any school to obtain a positive result. Or more accurately, it is not 
even necessary to do well at all; it is only necessary to do not as badly as others. This 
is a ridiculous way of calculating school performance sui generis, as shown in this 
paper so far. But why, in particular, design the monitoring system like that at the same 
time as asking schools in England to form partnerships and federations, and to co-
operate more and more in the delivery of KS3 and the 14-19 Reform Programme? 
 
 
What does it all mean? 
 
The whole school effectiveness model, as currently imagined, should be abandoned. It 
clearly does not and could not work as intended, so it causes all of the damage and 
danger described above for no good reason. It continues partly as a kind of Voodoo 
science (Park 2000), wherein adherents prefer to claim they are dealing with random 
events, making it easier to explain away the uncertainty and unpredictability of their 
results. But it also continues for the same reasons as it was created in the first place. 
We want to be able to measure school performance, and we know that mere raw-score 
figures tell us largely about the school intake. However, we must not continue with 
school effectiveness once aware of its flaws simply because we cannot imagine what 
to do instead. The purpose of this paper is to try and end the domination of school 
policy and much of research by the standard school effectiveness model. That is a big 
task for one paper. It is not my intention here to provide a fully worked-out 
alternative.13 
 
We perhaps need to re-think what we mean by a school effect. In traditional models, a 
school effect refers to the difference going to one school makes in comparison to 
going to another school. There are many other possible meanings we could 
operationalise, including what difference it makes going to one school as opposed to 
not going school at all. We need to decide whether we are happy for a school effect to 
be zero-sum, whether a school is really a proper unit of analysis, and how we will 
estimate the maximum propagation of errors. I would like to see much greater care in 
                                                 
13 One promising avenue is based on regression discontinuity (e.g. Luyten 2006). This has the major 
advantage over CVA of not being zero-sum in nature. All schools could improve and be recognised for 
this (and vice versa), and groups of schools or whole districts can be assessed as co-operative units in 
which the success of any unit adds to the success of any other. Surely something like this is better for 
now and for the future.  
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the design of research and the collection of data, rather than effort expended on 
creating increasingly complex and unrealistic methods to analyse the poorer data from 
existing poor designs and models. We need more active designs for research, such as 
randomised controlled trials to find out what really works in school improvement, 
rather than post hoc data dredging. We need more mixed methods studies, and more 
care and humility in our proposed research claims. Education research is, rightly, a 
publicly-funded enterprise with potential impacts for all citizens. If our research is as 
poorly crafted as school effectiveness seems to be then we face two possible dangers. 
If it has no real-life impact then the research funding has been wasted. There is a 
significant opportunity cost. Worse, if it has the kind of widespread impact that school 
effectiveness has had for thirty years, then in addition to the waste of money, incorrect 
policy and practice decisions will be made, and pupils and families will suffer the 
consequences. 
 
One clear finding that is now largely unremarked by academics and unused by policy-
makers is that pupil prior attainment and background explain the vast majority of 
variation in school outcomes. This finding is clear because its scale and consistency 
over time and place dwarfs the error component in the calculation (largely because the 
error does not have a chance to propagate in the same way as for CVA analysis). Why 
is this not more clearly understood and disseminated by politicians? In England, we 
have built a system of maintained schools that remains loosely comprehensive, and is 
funded quite equitably (more so than the USA, for example), on a per-pupil basis 
adjusted for special circumstances. The curriculum is largely similar (the National 
Curriculum) for ages 5 to 14 at least, taught by nationally-recognised teachers with 
Qualified Teacher Status, inspected by a national system (OFSTED), and assessed by 
standardised tests up to Key Stage 3. Education is compulsory for all, and free at the 
point of delivery. In a very real sense it sounds as though it would not matter much 
which school a pupil attends, in terms of qualifications as an outcome. And indeed, 
that is what decades of research have shown is true.  
 
Are parents and pupils being misled into thinking that which school they use does 
make a substantial difference? Perhaps, or perhaps qualifications at age 16 are not 
what parents and pupils are looking for when they think of a new school for a child 
aged 4 or even 10.14 School choice research suggests that what families are really 
looking for is safety and happiness for their children (Gorard 1997). When thinking 
about moving a 10-year-old from a small primary school in which they are the oldest 
to a much larger, more distant secondary school with students up to the age of 19, 
security is often the major concern. This is why proximity can be seen as a rational 
choice. It is also possible that parents know perfectly well that raw-scores are not an 
indication of the quality of the school attended but of the other pupils attending. Using 
raw scores might be a rational way for a lay person to identify a school in which 
learning was an important part of everyday school life. Raw scores, like bus stop 
behaviour, are used as a proxy indication of school intake.  
 
If so, several conclusions might follow. Politicians could disseminate the truth that in 
terms of traditional school outcomes it makes little difference which school a pupil 
attends. This might reduce the allure of specialisms, selection by aptitude or 
                                                 
14 Or perhaps parents are smarter than policy-makers, realising that current VA scores for any school or 
phase are historical and tell them only what might have happened if their child had started at that 
school five years ago. 
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attainment, faith-based schools, and other needlessly divisive elements for a national 
school system. It could reduce the so-called premium on housing near to what are 
currently considered good schools, and reduce the journey times to schools (since the 
nearest school would be as good as the furthest). All of this would be associated with 
a decline in socio-economic and educational segregation between schools. SES 
segregation between schools has been a rising problem in England since 1997 (Gorard 
2009b). Reduced segregation by attainment and by student background has many 
advantages both for schools and for wider society, as well as becoming a repeating 
cycle, making schools genuinely comprehensive in intake as well as structure, so 
giving families even less reason to look beyond their nearest schools. It would also 
mean that, on current figures, no schools would be part of the National Challenge. 
Schools are earmarked for the National Challenge if their KS4 raw score benchmark 
of pupils attaining the equivalent of five good GCSEs is less than 30%. Since the 
overall national figure is considerably higher than 30%, the National Challenge is less 
an indication of poor schools and more an indictment of the levels of academic 
segregation in the system. Redistributing school intakes solves the problem at a 
stroke.  
 
Perhaps even more importantly, once policy-makers understand how CVA works and 
that they cannot legitimately use it to differentiate school performance, they may 
begin to question the dominance of the school effectiveness model more generally. 
We might see a resurgence of political and research interest in school processes and 
outcomes other than pencil-and-paper test results. Schools are mini-societies in which, 
according to surveys, pupils may learn how to interact, what to expect from wider 
society, and how to judge fairness (Gorard and Smith 2009). Schools seem to be a key 
influence on pupils’ desire to take part in future learning opportunities (Gorard et al. 
2007), and on their occupational aspirations (Gorard and Rees 2002). All of these 
outcomes have been largely ignored in three decades of school effectiveness research. 
It is time to move on.  
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